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What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of 
association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say 
something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the 
brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing out what is needed to read those thoughts. Simply put, 
ontologically, thought is in the brain, epistemologically, it is not. 
 
 
We all know that learning how to speak and think requires 
that we grow up in a society among people who already 
know how to do so. Without them such learning would not 
happen. Other people, other brains, and many cultural and 
bodily features are needed and involved in the process. 
But once we have learned how to do it, we can close our 
eyes and think by ourselves. Now imagine someone asks 
you what is the sum of 227 and 159. You concentrate and 
close your eyes and after some mental calculation you tell 
him the sum is 386. When asked the question, vibrations 
of air strike your ears. Your brain operates and after a 
while your mouth produces other vibrations of air that 
reach the ears of your interlocutor, who nods with a smile 
of satisfaction. The only thing that has happened in the 
time between the question (the air waves striking your 
ears) and the answer (your mouth forming other air waves) 
has been the operations in your body, especially in your 
brain. Nothing else has had any causal impact of rele-
vance. A bird was flying by and your opponent was eagerly 
waiting. But this did not matter.  
Such a simple thought experiment makes me think that 
the calculation happens not only in your “mind” as we say, 
but more specifically in your body, especially your brain. 
There are no ghosts, neither in your brain, nor outside. If 
you think the thought experiment is inappropriate because 
calculating is not thinking, we can imagine another thought 
experiment. A friend asks you whether you want to have 
dinner with him next Wednesday in such and such a res-
taurant. You think about your schedule for next week and 
whether you really want to have dinner with this friend and 
whether you like the restaurant for that occasion. After a 
few seconds, you give an answer. We can also imagine 
that this happens over the telephone and that you ask your 
friend to wait for a moment because you have to think. You 
close your eyes and think about the question for a minute 
and then reply. Also here, all that went on between the 
moment when the air waves struck your ears and the mo-
ment when your mouth formed other air waves were the 
operations in your body, especially your brain. Imagining 
the dinner is something that you can feel in your stomach. 
If affects your stomach and this affects your decision. The 
mere thought of seeing your friend again, and being seen 
with him, is something that you can feel inside of you. The 
feeling, and the thought, takes place in your whole body, 
including your fingertips. In any case, all that had a causal 
impact on the answer in that interval of time was happen-
ing in your body. Of course the temperature and general 
atmosphere in your office also had an influence. But also 
that was felt and dealt with in your body then.  
Based on the above considerations, it seems to me that 
we can say that thought happens in the body, especially in 
the brain. But who can read and understand it? If some 
smart neuroscientist were to look into your brain while you 
were adding the numbers or thinking about the invitation 
for dinner, would he be able to tell what you think? Could 
he tell what you were about to answer when you had made 
up your mind? Starting at the end, with your answer: If he 
had a graphic record of the air waves your mouth pro-
duced (1), together with a smart translation manual of such 
graphic records into written words (0), he could read your 
answer off in this way. If, moving closer to the thought 
process itself, he had a graphic record of your brain activi-
ties (2) that dictate the movements of your mouth, together 
with another smart translation manual of such graphic re-
cords into the kind of graphic record (1) mentioned above, 
he could read your answer as well. It is difficult for us to 
imagine what such graphic records would have to look like, 
but it is even more difficult to imagine how reading your 
thoughts in the middle of the process of thinking (3) would 
look like, because especially for this we do not have the 
appropriate words at all. They would have to be invented 
by cognitive scientists. Thoughts in the making are vague, 
momentary, and fleeting. Also the experimental data are 
not available so far. Maybe one day they will. Then the 
words will be invented, and mind reading will be possible 
to some degree and in some way. What is going on in the 
brain is very different from words and well-formed sen-
tences as we have them now, and it is also different from 
what we now understand by “thought” (because we have 
very limited understanding of it so far). There is a long way 
from neuron firings to our present, everyday understanding 
of thought, be it in terms of words or images. If in the future 
more data are available and a new vocabulary has devel-
oped with those data, mind reading will be possible to 
some degree. But it will not be a mapping as we might ex-
pect it now, because at present time we do not have the 
words for such mind reading. At least so far we don’t.  
This brings me back to the other two questions raised at 
the beginning of this essay: Is our thinking linguistic and 
some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some 
kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Ben-
nett and Hacker in Philosophical Foundations of Neurosci-
ence (2003) have argued that thought depends on lan-
guage. A dog can be said to expect to be taken for a walk 
when it becomes excited because it hears his master 
come. But does this mean that the dog “thinks” it will be 
“taken for a walk”? I have my doubts here. Peter Hacker is 
more generous, or optimistic, here. He writes: “It makes 
perfectly good sense to say of a dog that it thinks some-
thing or other, as long as what it is said to think is some-
thing that can be manifest in its behavioural repertoire. A 
dog may now think that it is going to be taken for a walk – 
if it hears its leash being taken off the peg, it rushes excit-
edly to the door, wagging its tail and barking excitedly. But 
it cannot now think that it is going to be taken for a walk 
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next Wednesday.” (335). I think it is problematic, even 
without mentioning Wednesday, to say that a dog can 
think it will be “taken for a walk”, because our description 
uses the words “taken” and “walk” and I am not sure that 
dogs have comparable concepts. Bennett and Hacker 
think of a comparable behavioral repertoire and maybe I 
could accept this. 
A similar problem can be seen in a passage from Witt-
genstein in which he compares expectation to fulfillment, 
as well as the imagination of seeing to the actual seeing of 
someone coming into a room: “How does it look when he 
comes? – The door opens, someone walks in, and so on. 
– How does it look if I expect him to come? – I walk up and 
down in the room, look at the clock now and then, and so 
on. – But the one occurrence does not have the slightest 
similarity to the other! So how can one use the same 
words in describing them? – But perhaps I say as I walk up 
and down: ‘I expect him to come’. – Now there is a similar-
ity at hand. But of what kind?” (PI 444, translation by Mal-
colm)  Norman Malcolm in the essay “The Mystery of 
Thought” has commented on this passage. He says: “The 
similarity between the two lies in the language” (193), and 
he quotes Wittgenstein: “It is in language that expectation 
and fulfillment make contact” (PI 445). In PI 444 Wittgen-
stein also says, that “language abstracts” from the differ-
ence, for instance regarding expectation and fulfillment. I 
think this makes sense when the issue is about our human 
thoughts, expectations, and imaginations, because we 
humans have language and for us language can be said to 
abstract from differences. But dogs cannot speak. Hence I 
would not be sure about this way of relying on language to 
bridge the gap between our thinking “he comes” and a 
dog’s supposedly thinking “he comes”. Dogs cannot 
speak. They do not have a say in this. 
Of course, in the passages quoted above, Malcolm and 
Wittgenstein are concerned with human thought in relation 
to language, not about animal thought. Malcolm con-
cludes: “When we speak truthfully and without deceiving 
ourselves, the objects of our thought are what we say they 
are. There is no gap between our language and the ob-
jects of our thought, a gap that needs to be bridged by sur-
rogates or mental intermediaries” (194). This I think makes 
sense in case we have words for our thoughts, such as “I 
expect him to come”. But it will be problematic when we 
think of human thoughts that are in the process of develop-
ing and where the words to describe them are not avail-
able. This is comparable to the situation when we think of 
what a dog might be “thinking”. In both cases, we lack 
data, insight, and vocabulary. 
Instead of focusing on animals, let me introduce ways of 
thinking we humans sometimes entertain and that are also 
not easily translatable into words. Bennett and Hacker give 
useful examples here, namely from mathematical thought. 
They quote Einstein saying: “The words of the language, 
as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role 
in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which 
seem to serve as elements of thought are certain signs 
and more or less clear images which can be ‘voluntarily’ 
reproduced and combined” (338). Similarly, Roger Pen-
rose writes: “Almost all my mathematical thinking is done 
visually and in terms of non-verbal concepts. … Often … 
there simply are not the words available to express the 
concepts that are required. I often calculate using specially 
designed diagrams which constitute a shorthand for cer-
tain types of algebraic expression. … This is not to say that 
I do not sometimes think in words, it is just that I find words 
almost useless for mathematical thinking.” (ibid.)  I agree. I 
myself used to be a professional mathematician before 
turning into a professional philosopher, and I agree with 
Penrose’s description. I also imagine that architects and all 
kinds of handicraft workers, sportsmen, and musicians do 
not think in words but rely on visual and bodily concepts 
that we do not easily have words for in our everyday lan-
guage. They use these concepts when they work and play 
intuitively, and these concepts are rooted in their body in 
relation to certain tools, instruments, and other forms of 
environment. These are know-how concepts that are 
imbedded in the life-worlds of these practitioners and we 
do not easily have words for them. Linguistic thoughts form 
only part of the world of thought. Of course taking things 
this way presupposes a wide notion of concept and 
thought, one that includes know-how concepts. I tend to 
subscribe to such a notion. 
Bennett and Hacker argue that Penrose’s description of 
mathematical thought is “misleading” (345), because a 
mathematician still thinks in “universally accepted symbols” 
and concepts that have “rule-governed use” (ibid). I dis-
agree. I believe that relying on symbols and their rule-
governed use is not Penrose’s main point. Creative 
mathematical thought also involves foggy, imprecise, am-
biguous, momentary, private diagrams and procedures for 
which we do not have rule-governed, fixed, and universally 
accepted symbols. It is here, in this fog, where I think inspi-
ration takes place. How else should it happen? (See 
Wenzel 2001) 
Coming back to the question of whether thoughts hap-
pen in the brain, or body, I would say, yes, they do. But I 
would immediately add that in order to understand them 
one needs to understand their use as well. One cannot just 
look into the body, or brain, from the outside and read the 
thoughts off there, without having the right translation 
manual, which in turn requires the proper words, which 
unfortunately we often do not have. Allow me to illustrate 
this with an analogy. To understand what a car is, you 
must know how it is used. If a car were transported into 
another world that has no gravitation, the people living 
there would have a hard time figuring out what a car is by 
just looking at it. The wheels in that world would be literally 
“spinning in the void”, if I may use metaphor, one McDow-
ell uses to explain that concepts go “all the way out”. Con-
cepts are rooted in perception and use. Similarly, cars 
must be driven on the road. Thoughts must be put into ac-
tion. The handicraft worker has know-how, and the re-
searcher in mathematics engages in non-standard opera-
tions. For this we often do not have the appropriate words, 
as we don’t have them for the thoughts happening in their 
brains.  
The passage from Wittgenstein, quoted above, is about 
thoughts that can be expressed in words. But I think that 
for many of our thoughts and concepts we do not have 
suitable words. In this I assume a wide notion of what 
thoughts are. Furthermore, I imagine thoughts when they 
gradually unfold and develop. I think of the process of 
thinking. When doing research, mathematicians not only 
use formulas but also they often imagine things in idiosyn-
cratic and non-standard ways, allowing variation, modifica-
tion, vagueness, and indeterminacy, and even, momentar-
ily, contradiction. Handicraft workers use their hands and 
they show us how to do things. Musicians and athletes 
perform and play for us to see and hear. This is how they 
express themselves. Words do not suffice. Bennett and 
Hacker say that the limits of thought are the limits of “be-
havioral repertoire” and “possible expression” (335). That 
is fine, but I wish to add that behavioral repertoire and ex-
pression do not need to be standard. They can be idiosyn-
cratic. The same applies to thought, for instance as it oc-
curs in a researcher’s mind. Supposing that “a concept is 




an abstraction from the use of words” (339) makes the no-
tion of a concept too narrow, at least to my taste. 
In any case, it seems to me that, no matter how much 
one restricts thought to linguistic thought, it remains true 
that, on the one hand, thought happens in the body (brain) 
and, on the other hand, being able to read this kind of 
thought (in the body, and especially in the brain) requires 
an understanding of the use of the relevant concepts. 
Looking at the handicraft worker, the athlete, or the musi-
cian in order to understand what they think and what is 
going on in their minds, one must understand what they 
do. (Just as, in order to understand what a car is, one must 
know how to drive it in this world.) It will be difficult to come 
up with a translation manual from brain activity into words, 
because we do not have the right words to express how 
the activities of handicraft workers, sportsmen, musicians, 
or mathematicians are actually formed. Too many factors 
come in. We do not have words to express know-how 
thoughts. We often prefer to show what we mean. Nor do 
we have the words to express the process of inspiration in 
doing research in mathematics.  
From such considerations we can see that it will be diffi-
cult to read brain activities. This applies to thoughts in 
general when they are in the process of being developed 
and formed. Talking about this does not belong to our rep-
ertoire. Thought is hidden, fleeting, complex and momen-
tary. I think we could bring it out to some degree, but so far 
we do not have the words for such momentary processes. 
We only have the words for our everyday activities as far 
as we can make distinctions, plus the specialized vocabu-
lary used by scientists and other specialists. But so far we 
neither have the words to describe brain activities nor the 
data of those activities. At least we have very little of this at 
the moment. Things will change, as our life worlds will 
change. Mind reading will have to become everyday, at 
least for some specialists. But that is for the future. 
Literature  
Bennett, M.R. and P.M.S. Hacker 2003 Philosophical Foundations 
of Neuroscience, Blackwell Publishing. 
Malcolm, Norman 1995 Wittgensteinian Themes. Essays 1978-
1989 edited by Georg Henrik von Wright, Cornell University Press. 
Wenzel, Christian Helmut 2001 “Beauty, Genius, and Mathematics. 
Why Did Kant Change His Mind?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 
18/4, pp. 415-432. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations translated 
by G.E.M. Anscombe. 
 
